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COMMENT
DILEMMA OF THE FLORIDA DEFENDANT IN A PERSONAL
INJURY SUIT*
I. Tin? ERA OF NEGLIGENCE
The great criminal lawyer was front page news and biographical material
in the early part of the twentieth century. Trials involving the possible
execution of the accused were living drama in which the personality of
counsel often overshadowed that of the defendant. Interest in this type
of trial has declined, pcrlaps because crimc has become more syndicated
and less passionate. Legal protection for the accused is greater than ever;
there is more mercy and less capital punishment.
There is a new courtroom scene. The negligence lawyer displays his
°immense photographs and charts, while medical experts show the jury
a section of a skeleton.' Bones, ligaments, tendons and nerves are the
medico-legal stock in trade. Specialization in negligence has led also to
organization and exchange of ideas at regular confereneesY Typical subjects
for papers or panel discussions are:
Pleading a Damage Suit;
Medical Preparation of a Personal Injury Suit;
Trauma and Cardiac Conditions;
The Typical Head Injury, Back and Nerve Lcsion Case.
3
It is not surprising that this highly lucrative field has drawn to it tal-
ented and enterprising attorneys, who, like the Darrows and Fallons are
making names in the history of the law. There arc analogies also in the
appeal to the sympathies of the jury and in the manner in which the
presentation of proof is weighted so that it benefits the physically injured
plaintiff as it protects the accused criminal.
Counsel are given wide latitude in argument, though it include "the
fanciful play of their imagination." 4 \Vhile argument should be restricted
*For a view from the plaintiff's side see Belli, The Adequate Award, 39 CALIF. L. REv.
1 (1951).
1. First Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n. of Miami v. Wylie, 46 So.2d 396, 400 (Fla.
1950). (Approved . . . "the use of medical charts of the human body and a skeleton of
the arm of a body to aid an expert witness in demonstrating to the jury the nature of
the injury to the plaintiff and its resultant incapacitating effect.")
2. National Ass'n. Claimants' Compensation Attorneys, Fifth Annual Convention,
San Francisco, Cal., August 6-12, 1951.
3, Supra note 2. These materials are not available to non-members.
4. olhnson v. State, 88 Fla. 461, 463, 102 So. 549, 550 (1924); Gaston v. State,
134 Fla. 538, 542, 184 So. 150, 151 (1938).
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to the evidence and reasonable deductions, wide discretion is given 5 and
the court encourages forensic talents)
II. LIABILITY: THE EFFECT OF SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DEFENSES
A rapid check of this phase of personal injury actions will show some
of the advantages that lie with the plaintiff. We deal in part with the
establishment of legal liability, but primarily with the effect of such de-
fenses as may be generally available to the parties.
Punitive and special damages. To recover exemplary or punitive dam-
ages7 the F]orida Supreme Court has required the showing of negligence of
such gross and flagrant character that it evinced a disregard for human
life.8 This reasoning is analogous to the culpable type of negligence neces-
sary to prove manslaughter in criminal cases.9 It is akin to the type of
negligence necessary to set aside the automobile guest statute.10 Reckless-
ness and wanton disregard for human life has, in law, become synonymous
with criminal intent.
Special damages are those that arise as a proximate result of negligence
of a lesser degree. Special damages should be alleged in the bill of com-
plaint, though they may be inferred from the facts."
Contributory negligence. While a legion of cases say that contributory
negligence is an affirmative defense" which should be pleaded and proved,"3
the issue nay actually be injected by plaintiff's presentation of his case,
which may raise a factual presumption of negligence from the evidence. 4
The defensive plea admits the negligence of the defendant and seeks to
cancel or minimize it.
Florida subscribes to the common law rule that the plaintiff's contribu.
tory negligence bars recovery for injuries,'" but the defendant must affirma-
tively prove that such contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury sustained.'8 Further, the negligence of the plaintiff and the de-
fendant must be "mutual, concurring and contemporaneous"'1 and the
plaintiff's action or non-action at the time must be objectively tested to
determine whether he should have known or foreseen the probable results
of his conduct.' 8
5. Alford v. Barnett Nat. Bank, 137 Fla. 564, 188 So. 322 (1939).
6. Henderson v. State, 94 Fla. 318, 113 So. 689, (1927).
7. Smith v. Bagwell, 19 Fla. 117 (1882).
8. Russ v. State, 140 Fla. 217, 191 So. 296 (1939).
9. Jackson v. Edwards, 144 Fla. 187, 197 So. 833 (1940).
10. FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1949).
11. lacksonville Elee. Co. v. Batchis, 54 Fla. 192, 44 So. 933 (1907).
12. E.g., Carter v. J. Ray Arnold Lumber Co., 8 3 Fla. 470, 91 So. 893 (1922).
13. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Good, 79 Fla. 589, 84 So. 733 (1920).
14. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Webb, 112 Fla. 449, 150 So. 741 (1933).
15. General Outdoor Adv. v. Frost, 76 F.2d 127 (S.D. Fla. 1935).
16. Connell v. Petri, 159 Fla. 67, 30 So.2d 922 (1947).
17. Winner v. Sharp, 43 So.2d 634 (Fla. 1949).
18. The "reasonable man" test. Lindsay v. Thomas, 128 Fla. 293, 174 So. 418
(1937).
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Whether plaintiff is contributorily negligent is for the jury19 and it
is submitted that juries will often refuse to find contributory negligence,
although verdicts will show that they applied comparative negligence doc-
trines, which in Florida are lawfully applied only under statutes governing
railroads'" and hazardous occupations 1 Thus, although the majority of
answers in personal injury actions allege contributory negligence, its
effectiveness as a defense has limitations of proof and jury reaction.
Last clear chance. This doctrine is said by the supreme court not to
constitute an exception to the doctrine of contributory negligence, but to
be a qualification of it.?' It is recognized in Florida23 and may operate
in the plaintiff's favor,2 4 negativing plaintiff's negligence in some instances.
It need not be specially pleaded.
2
1
Concurrent negligence. The plaintiff may hold two or more persons
jointly or severally liable where their concerted or independent acts con-
curred to produce injury to him? Liability is imposed even if neither of the
acts without the concurrence of the other would have caused the accident.
2 7
Imputed negligence. It is well settled law that the doctrine of imputed
negligence does not obtain in Florida-"' This operates in favor of the
plaintiff, especially minor children.2 0 Within the family relation of hus-
band and wife it may be possible to prove joint venture 0 or to rely on the
fiction of husband and wife being one legal entity.,3 A passenger in an
automobile which collides with a truck may sue the truck driver and truck
owner, despite the negligence of the driver of the automobile.8 2
19. Sokolsky v. Feigen, 49 So.2d 88 (Fla. 1950).
20. FLA. STAT. § 768.06 (1949); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Fogleman, 117 Fla.
334, 158 So. 108 (1934) (Verdict for $15,000.00 reduced to $9,000.00 on basis that it
could be inferred from evidence that plaintiff's decedent was contributorily negligent);
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Britton, 109 Fla. 212, 146 So. 842 (1933). (Contributory
negligence may be considered in reducing damages, though not pleaded).
21. FLA. STAT. § 769.03 (1949).
22. Dunn Bus Service Inc. v. McKinley, 120 Fla. 778, 178 So. 865 (1937).
23. Miller v. Ungar, 149 Fla. 79, 5 So.2d 598 (1942); Miami Beach Ry. v. Dohme,
131 Fla. 171, 179 So. 166 (1938).
24. Ward v. City Fuel Oil Co., 147 Fla. 320, 2 So.2d 586 (1941). Under the last
clear chance doctrine plaintiff must, in addition to showing that defendant was negligent
in failing to avert the accident after knowledge of the situation in sufficient time to act
on it, show that plaintiff's negligence did not continue up to the moment of injury and
was not a contributing and efficient cause.
25. Kenan v. Withers, 137 Fla. 561, 188 So. 95 (1939).
26. Putnam Lumber Co. v. Berry, 146 Fla. 595, 2 So.2d 133 (1941); Nichols v.
Rothkopf, 135 Fla. 749, 185 So. 725 (1939).
27. Red Top Cab & Baggage Co. v, Masilotti, 190 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1951).
28. Arline v. Brown, 190 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1951); Tampa Elec, Co. v. Bazemore,
85 Fla. 164, 96 So. 297 (1923).
29. Burdine's Inc. v. McConnell, 146 Fla. 512, 1 So.2d 462 (1941).
30. Caliando v. Huck, 84 F. Supp. 598 (N,D. Fla. 1949).
31. In Corren v. Corrcn, 47 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1950), where husband entrusted auto-
mobile to daughter, wife could-not recover from husband for injuries sustained as the re-
sult of daughter's negligent.operation. The court said that FLA. STAT. § 708.08 (1949)
did not abrogate the common law fiction of husband and wife as one entity. See also
Lundy v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 354 (N. D. Fla. 1948).
32. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Mahlo, 45 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1950).
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Respondeat superior. In addition to the normal liabilities of a
principal for the torts of his agent operating within the scope of authority,
the doctrine of respondcat superior extends to liability of an owner of a
motor vehicle for the accidents of any driver to whom lie may intrust that
vehicle.3 3 It is but a step from here to the current holding that the bailor
of an automobile is liable for the torts of the bailee.A4 As a result, the
U-Drive-It businesses that flourish in resort cities have considerable dif-
ficulty in securing and retaining sufficient insurance to cover the eventuali-
ties which the application of this doctrine present.
The rationale which so applies the ancient principle of agency is the
modem one that an automobile is a dangerous intrumentality."?'  Since
the majority of personal injury actions arise from the operation of motor
vehicles, it can readily be seen that the defendant's chance to escape liability
is negligible. 6
Self-presenation. It is assumed that the plaintiff did everything
possible to escape injury.,7
Violation of statute - negligence per se. The defendant is liable if
the statute is one designed to protect the plaintiff from the particular
hazard; 8 otherwise; violation of an ordinance should not serve as the
only criterion for determining negligence.39 It has been held, however,
that parking of a truck on a traveled highway at night, with lights shining
in an unnatural position across the highway, and with no flares out,
constitutes negligence per se.4
0
Automobile guest statute. The driver is protected against suits by his
invitees unless he is guilty of gross negligence or wilful and wanton mis-
conduct.
41
Other invitees - business guests. While an owner is not an insurer
of his premises as to visitors4a there is a legal duty to use reasonable care
33. Carter v. Baby Dy-Dee Service, 159 Fla. 380, 31 So.2d 400 (1947); Holstun v.
Embry, 124 Fla. 554, 160 So. 400 (1936).
34. Yarbrough v. Ball U-Drive-It System, Inc., 48 So.2d 82 (Fla. 1950); Lynch v.
Walker, 159 Fla. 188, 31 So.2d 268 (1947), overruling White v. Holmes, 89 Fla. 251,
103 So. 623 (1925). The White case had held that a person bailing to another for hire
an automobile without driver would not be liable to a third party unless negligent in
selection of the bailee. The Lynch case establishes a doctrine which is in effect one of
strict liability.
35. Foremost Dairies v. Godwin, 158 Fla. 245, 26 So.2d 773 (1946). In Grain
Dealers Nat. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 190 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1951) the danger-
ous instrumentality doctrine was extended to the operation of airplanes.
36. The fact that the name of a trucking company was painted on a truck, the
company having received permission from the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission
for the truck's operation, was held to be a Prima facie showing of ownership for a per-
sonal injury action arising out of the truck's collision with another vehicle. Wilson v.
Burke, 53 So.2d 319 (17a. 1951).
37. White v. Hughes, 139 Fla. 54, 190 So. 446 (1939); Murden v. Miami Poultry
& Egg Co., 113 Fla. 870, 152 So. 714 (1934).
38. Lewis v. Miami, 127 Fla. 426, 173 So. 150 (1937).
39. Crosby v. Donaldson, 95 Fla. 365, 116 So. 231 (1928).
40. Steele v. Independent Fish Co., 152 Fla. 739, 13 So.2d 14 (1943).
41. FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1949). See Note, 5 MiAmi L. Q. 510 (1951).
42. Moulden v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 147 Fla. 36, 2 So.2d 302 (1941).
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for the safety of persons who may use the premises under express or
implied invitation
3.4
Res ipsa loquitur. This is a rule of evidence, as distinguished from
one of law. 4 By shifting the burden of proof, it may operate greatly to
the advantage of the plaintiff.4a It is often invoked in situations where
beverages bottles explode. In such a case the plaintiff must prove the
control of the defendant, with a showing that the bottle was not im-
properly handled or subjected to unusual atmospheric changes or changes
in temperature.46 The plaintiff need not exhaust all probabilities to shift
the burden of proof to the defendant.47
Attractive nuisance. The defendant is liable for dangerous and un-
protected places on his property which may attract immature children.4 s
Family of plaintiff. In an early case49 the supreme court deemed it
improper to receive evidence in a personal injury suit concerning the
marital status or number and ages of plaintiff's family. This old rule has
been vitiated by later cases50 so that the showing of additional family
responsibilities in the case of the breadwinner should tend to increase the
size of the verdict.
Pleadings - technicalities. The new Florida Common Law and
Equity Rules,51 designed to simplify pleadings and expedite hearings, are
being liberally interpreted. Although special damages must be alleged,5 2
a bill of complaint may be amended to conform to whatever is elicited at
the trial, and it is practically never too late to amend.58 The defendant's
maneuver of postponing trial, aided by crowded court dockets, is losing
its effectiveness as additional circuit judges are appointed.
Witnesses; cross-examination. The rule in Florida is that a witness
may be cross-questioned only on matters brought out in the examination-
in-chief.514 Inroads upon this rule are heavy, especially at master's hearings,
the rationale being that it is better to bring out the whole truth.
Exhibits. The case with which exhibits are introduced into evidence
43. alll v. Holland, 47 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1949).
44. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 129 Pla. 518, 177
So. 294 (1937).
43. See Comment, Application of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur to Food Cases.
3 MrAMI L. Q. 613 (1949).
46. Henning v. Thompson, 45 So.2d 755 (Fla. 1950); Hughs v. Miami Coca.Cola
Bottling Co., 155 Fla. 299. 19 So.2d 862 (1944).
47. West Coast Hospital Ass'n v. Webb, 52 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1951); Groves v. Flor-
ida Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 40 So.2d 128 (Fla. 1949).
48. E.g., Newby v. West Palm Beach Water Co., 47 So.2d 527 (Fla. 1950).
49. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Collingsworth, 45 Fla. 403, 33 So. 513 (1903).
50. In McHugh v. Miami Transit Co., 159 Fla. 760, 32 So.2d 735 (1947) the
court upheld a $40,000.00 verdict as not excessive in the case of a man "earning
$3900.00 annually and having a wife and two children."
5I. FiA. STAT. ANN. 1941, Vol. 31. Adopted by Supreme Court of Florida Nov. 22,
1949; effective Jan. 1, 1950.
52. J. Ray Arnold Lumber Corp. v. Richardson, 105 Fla. 204, 141 So. 133
(1932).
53. Messana v. Maule Industries, 50 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1951).
54. Hampton v. State, 50 Fla. 55, 39 So. 421 (1905).
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might well astonish an older jurist accustomed to strict procedure. Many
experienced defense attorneys prefer to refrain from objecting at this stage
of the trial.
Photographs have been held admissible, though gruesome, so long as
the evidence indicated that the pictures reflected the true condition of
the plaintiff. 5 Maps, plans and pictures have repeatedly been held to be
acceptable in evidence.50 A photograph of an automobile, taken after re-
moval from the scene of the accident and submitted by a witness who
was not the photographer, was deemed acceptable in evidence where the
witness insisted that the photographs .,were a true representation of the
condition of the automobile.
5 7
A line of demarcation. There is apparently one type of situation
where rules aid the defendant, but it may be of little aid, except perhaps
to mark the limits beyond which the court will not go. A directed verdict
for plaintiff will rarely be given except when it is clear that there is no
evidence whatever adduced that could in law support a verdict for de-
fendant. 8 The supreme court could not tolerate a directed verdict in a
situation where defendant claimed unavoidable accident while the trial
judge insisted that, by law, the situation was negligence per se.50
At the trial level, a barrage of negligence actions, some improperly
prepared or without a solid legal liability foundation, have resulted in
many jury verdicts for defendants. Negligence lawyers in Dade County,
Florida, point to the fact that more local personal injury cases are decided
in favor of defendants than of plaintiffs.
III. THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
The judicial attitude toward large verdicts has undergone a decided
change during the past ten years. There are both social and legal reasons
advanced to explain the new philosophy. The turning point coincides with
the new mortality tables. 0 Older cases are of slight value as precedents
in this rapidly changing field of law.
Principal elements. The items sought to be changed into dollars,
to be proved by the plaintiff are:61
55. See Breeding's Dania Drug Co. v. Runyon, 147 Fla, 123, 124, 2 So.2d 376,
377 (1941).
56. Baston v. Shelton, 152 Fla. 879, 13 So.2d 453 (1943); Stanley v. Powers, 125
Fla. 322, 169 So. 861 (1936); Young v. State, 85 Fla. 348, 96 So. 381 (1923).
57. Miami v. McCorkle, 145 Fla. 109, 199 So. 575 (1941).
58. Katz v. Bear, 52 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1951); Welborn v. Kemp, 141 Fla. 89, 192
So. 469 (1939).
59. Oppenheimer v. Werner, 46 So.2d 870 (Fla. 1950).
60. American Experience Table of Mortality, 27 FLA. STAT. ANN. (1941), p. 351
et seq. Mortality tables are proper evidence. Tallahassee v. Ashmore, 158 Fla. 73,
27 So.2d 660 (1946). They are admissible only where there is evidence supporting
permanent injury. Ward v. Stanley, 130 Fa. 642, 178 So. 398 (1938).
61. Key West v. Baldwin, 69 Fla. 136, 139, 67 So. 808, 813 (1915).
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(1) Loss of time during hospitalization and cure. 2
(2) Expense of cure.
(3) Permanence of injury in relation to future loss.
(4) Pain and suffering.
The first two items are capable of exact proof, and actual damages
are recoverable as a matter of right0 3 but item (3) requires expert medical
testimony coupled with an ability on the part of counsel to elicit it by
proper questioning. Since the matter of damages will be settled once and
for all time during one suit,0 4 the determination of the permanence of
the injury is highly important. So is the degree of disability. For example,
the difference in one-half and threc-quarters disability for the plaintiff
whose life expectancy is forty years, measured on the basis of $60.00 per
week, would be $15.00 per week for 2080 weeks, or $31,200.00.
Pain and suffering. The Florida Supreme Court has taken judicial
notice that "mental pain and suffering (that thing commonly called 'worry')
• . . affects every vital organ and probably results in more mental and
physical wrecks than any other one affliction.",65 Such pain and suffering
are not compensable unless there has been injury to the person, property,
health or reputation," except where there was a malicious tort.07 As a
guide the court has indicated that recovery should be limited to such pain
and suffering as evidence shows the plaintiff is reasonably certain to
endure. 8 Given a sympathetic "reasonable" jury the elastic yardstick begins
to stretch in favor of the plaintiff.
Where pain and suffering continued for a past and definitely measur-
able period, the supreme court has not disturbed verdicts which apparently
allowed plaintiffs approximately one hundred dollars per week.6 9 Where
future pain and suffering are to be computed the measure is more in-
definite, but it is noted that recent verdicts have allowed approximately
$20,000.00.7" There is great consideration shown to children, 7' a natural
concomitant of the state's responsibility for infants.
Taking the measure of future pain, suffering or disfigurement from
both the physical and mental standpoint, depending upon the degree in
62. Ready v. Pure Carbonic, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Fla. 1949).
63, Florida East Coast Ry. v. McRoberts, 111 Fla. 278, 149 So. 631 (1933).
64. Gritting Bros. Co. v. Winfield, 53 Fla. 589, 43 So. 687 (1907).
65. Baldwin v. Baldwin, 151 Fla. 341, 344, 9 So.2d 717, 721 (1942).
66. Mees v. Western Union Tel. Co., 55 F.2d 691 (S.D. Fla. 1932).
67. Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1950).
68. Grainger v. Fuller, 72 Fa. 57, 72 So. 462 (1916).
69. Florida Motor Lines Corp. v. Shontz, 32 So.2d 248 (Fla. 1947); Ake v.
Birnbaum, 156 Fla. 735, 25 So.2d 213 (1946).
70. Renuart Lumber Yards Inc. v. Levine, 49 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1950) ($30,000.00
for pain and suffering reduced to $16,475.05; 42-year-old man with life expectancy of
28 years); TaIiiiaiui Trail Tours, Inc. v, Wooten, 47 So.2d 743 (Fla. 1950) ($21,-
000.00 allowed for pain, suffering and disfigurement; 20-year-old woman with life ex-
pectancy of 41 years).
71. Porter v. Gordon, 46 So.2d 19 (Fla. 1950). (The court's judicial conscience
was shocked by inadequate damages); Vining v. American Bakeries, 118 Fla. 572, 159
So. 671 (1935); Burnett v. Allen, 114 Fla. 489, 154 So. 515 (1934).
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the individual case, it may readily be seen that a wide variance is possible.
For example, -with a life expectancy of 20 years, the allowance of one'
dollar per day is $7,200.00. An allowance of five dollars per day results in
$36,500.00.
Loss of consortium.72  The value of a housewife to her husband may
be roughly measured by the cases" and appears to be approximately $120.00
per month, for past and definitely measured periods.
Reasonableness of the jury. Reasonableness and the sound discretion
of the jury on the evidence before them7 4 are the ultimate legal criteria, 5
and the damages once fixed by the jury must shock the judicial conscience
to be changed." What it takes to shock the judicial conscience is a
variant worthy of profound study, but this factor is not capable of measure-
ment. The rule remains constant, but the judges change. 77
There is another element which may cause the setting aside of a ver-
dict. This is spoken of variously as the jury's flagrant passion, prejudice,
partiality, corruption, bias or some other element improperly influencing
it.71 This calls for judging the jury, a matter which the judiciary is extremely
reluctant to undertake insofar as the records go, but which undoubtedly
enters privately into the decisions which speak of shocking the judicial
conscience.
Damages are sufficiently proved if a reasonable basis is shown for
cut'pulatiun, though thw, ,ult is h--l, ,v,,,a, iiteJ 0 'fl. 0 pi,,,ne cout--
is reluctant to intervene and will ordinarily not substitute its findings for
72. FLs. STAT. § 46,09 (1949).
73. First Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n. of Miami v. Wylie, 46 So.2d 743 (Fla.
1950); Margaret Ann Supermarkets Inc, v. Scholl, 159 Fla. 748, 34 So.2d 238 (1948).
74. Bell Bakeries Inc. v. Giles, 145 Fla. 148, 198 So. 793 (1940); McDonald
v. Stone, 114 Fla. 608, 154 So. 327 (1934); Warfield v. Hepburn, 62 Fla. 409, 57
So. 618 (1912).
75. Margaret Ann Supermarkets Inc. v. Scholl, supra note 73; Florida Motor Lines
Corp. v. Shontz, 32 So.2d 248 (Fla. 1947); 'Werner v. Ware, 136 Fla. 466, 182 So.
605 (1938). 'When damages are "manifestly" or "flagrantly" inadequate or excessive
the trial court may set aside the jury verdict or may order a remittitur. Jernigan v.
Thompson, 103 Fla. 784, 139 So. 366 (1931). This is really covered within the doc-
trine of shocking the iudicial conscience.
76. Dunn Bus Service Inc. v. Wise, 140 Fla. 341, 191 So. 509 (1939); 'Werner
v. Ware, supra note 75; Jacksonville v. Vaughn, 92 Fla. 339, 110 So. 529 (1926).
77. Compare Florida Power & Light Co. v. Hargrove, 160 Fla. 405, 35 So.2d 1
(1948) with Sebring v. Avant, 95 Fla. 960, 117 So. 383 (1928). Compare Margaret
Ann Supermarkets Inc. v. Scholl, supra note 73 with 'Werner v. Ware, supra note 75.
In Florida Power & Light Co. v. Watson, 50 So.2d 543 (Fla. 1951) a verdict of $260,-
000.00 shocked the judicial conscience. justice Adams doubted that the evidence was
sufficient to submit the case to the jury. Liberal Justice Hobson indicated that there
was prejudice on the part of the jury which he had not found in the Renuart case.
The court's judicial conscience is sometimes shocked by the award of inadequate dam-
ages. Porter v. Gordon, supra note 71.
79. First Fed. Sav. & Loau AL3u. ft Miami v. 'Wylie, 46 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1950);
upton v. Hutchinson, 46 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1950); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Bazemore, 85 Fla.
164, 96 So. 297 (1923); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Dees, 56 Fla. 157, 48 So. 28
(1908).
79. Margaret Ann Supermarkets Inc. v. Schnoll, supra note 73; Rynveld v. Dupuis,
39 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1930).
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those of the jury.So However, remote, speculative or excessive damages
are not allowed 8' and the trial judge may set aside the verdict or order
a remittitur when the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
The rationale is that it is not the function of the appellate court to "try
cases de novo on cold typewritten manuscripts. 18 2
From an appellate standpoint the defendant will find no advantage
in trying the case in Federal court. Federal courts of appeal adhere to the
same theory and are less disposed to disturb verdicts than the Florida
Supreme Court.88
The "Present Value" of damages. An old rule is that future damages
are to be reduced to their present value.84 Like the courts of some other
states88 the Florida Supreme Court, speaking through the ebullient Mr.
Justice Terrell, has shown recognition of the high cost of living and the
decreased purchasing value of the dollar,80 a view strongly supported by
Mr. Justice Hobson in his dissent in the Renuart case.87 In addition,
Justice Hobson's dissent makes inroads upon the present value rule by
encouraging some future speculation as to changing wage scales.,, Two
dissenting federal judges in the Sunray case,"' considering future earnings,
thought it proper to consider a person's decreased earning capacity as he
grew older.90
The Annuity Theory: rates of interest. The Renuart91 and Sunray92
-CaZ-ur'tiL 11LtcUtIig-discussiOns anent-the -proper manner in which to
estimate damages. It is particularly appropriate to compare these two
cases in view of Florida's early following of the Texas view 93 and also
because this federal circuit will hear cases appealed from Florida federal
courts.
Theoretically, once having determined the loss of future earning
capacity, it is necessary only to decide the amount which would purchase
an annuity which during the period of plaintiff's life expectancy would
reimburse him for the loss.Y4 Variables again enter into such a computation;
80. Martin v. Stone, 51 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1951).
81. Atlanta & St. A. B3 Ry. v. Thomas, 60 Fla. 412, 53 So. 510 (1910).
82. Class v. Parrish, 5I So.2d 717, 721 (Fla. 1951).
83. Sunray Oil Corp. v. Albritton, 188 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
20 LAW WEEK 3089 (Oct. 1951).
84. Florida Dairies Co. v. Rogers, 119 Fla. 451, 161 So. 85 (1935); Seaboard Air
Line Ry. v. Watson, 94 Fla. 571, 113 So. 716 (1927).
85. E.g., Gilbertson v. Cross, -Minn.-, 45 N.W.2d 547 (1951).
86. Margaret Ann Supermarkets Inc. v. Scholl, supra note 73, at 241.
87. Renuart Lumber Yards Inc. v. Levine, supra note 70, at 103.
88. Id. at 103.
89. Sunray Oil Corp. v. Albritton, supra note 83, at 752.
90. Id. at 754.
91. Renuart Lumber Yards Inc. v. Levine, supra note 70.
92. Sunray Oil Corp. v. Albritton, supra note 83.
93. Florida Ry. & Navigation Co. v. Webster, 25 Fla. 394, 5 So. 714 (1889),which quoted Houston & T. C. R.R. v. Willie, 53.Tex. 318 (1880).
94. See note 60 supra.
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one is the rate of interest to be used; another is consideration that the
judgment funds are tax free.
Again the scales are weighted in the plaintiff's favor, because an ap-
pellate court will ascribe the most liberal computation to the jury, and
will not disturb it so long as any possible mathematical computation within
reason can be found for its support.
IV. THE EFFECT OF LARGE VERDICTS
Settlements. The increasing reluctance of courts to disturb verdicts
during the past ten years has operated to the advantage of the plaintiff. 5
Many business firms and insurance companies do not desire to go to trial in
cases involving recognized liability and serious injuries. Out-of-court set-
tlements, however, have become proportionately higher. 6  The insurer
must take a realistic view of the existing situation so the claimant is
placed in a more favorable position.
Statistics - nationwide. Claims arising from automotive liability in-
surance 6 have shown a steady increase in the past ten years, as evidenced
by the following statistics:9 7











95. Miami Transit Co. v. Poulton, 53 So2d 667 (Fla. 1951) (Dismissed without
opinion; verdict was $35,000.00); Miami Transit Co. v. Lee, 53 So.2d 667 (Fla. 1951)
(Dismissed without opinion. verdict was $74,305.00); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Johnson, 43 So.2d 715 (Fla. 1949) (Dismissed without opinion; verdict was $100,-
000.00). But ef. the Renuart ease, supra note 70, verdict of $75,000.00 was reduced
to $60,000.00).
96. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Watson, supra note 77, (Verdict was $260,-
000.00; settlement out-of-court was $151,000.00); Mueller v. Vanderbilt Hotel Corp.,
Circuit Court of Dade County, Fla., (1950) (Verdict was $150,000.00; settled for
$135,000.00 before motion for new trial presented); Bertha Green Sarasin and her
husband, Thomas L. Sarasin v. Florida Power & Light Co., Circuit Court of Dade
County, Fla., (1951) (Settled for $200,000.00; medical bills alone were $23,500.00
at date of settlement, the result of severe burns).
96. The Florida Financial Responsibility Law, FLA. STAT. c. 324 (1949) requires
insurance or satisfactory proof of financial responsibility to respond in damages. This
is not, however, a prerequisite to issuance of license plates or drivcr5, licciit.
97. Best's Fire and Casualty News, 1'9, l :s5. $ee, also, N. Y. Times, July 23,
1950, p. 48, col. 7. CulLpaaLite tables prepared by the National Bureau of Casualty
Oidr writers.
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Example of local effect. In hearings bcfore the Miami Beach City
Council concerning the necessity of increasing bus fares, officials of the
Miami Beach Railway Company gave as compelling reasons increased dam-
age claims and tendency of courts to grant higher damages.98 Statistics
presented by the company were as follows:
Amount expended for





The last figure was in excess of the sum of $153,835.00 allowed the company
for income tax purposes; however, company officials were insistent upon
the premise that when all damage claims for 1951 were paid out in sub-
sequent years, the figure would be actually around the $202,000.00 mark.
It is common knowledge in the Greater Miami area that the favorite
corporate targets of the specialized negligence lawyers are in similar straits.
The effect upon insurance companies is obvious. No gamblers, they have
produced statistical analyses to satisfy the State Insurance Commission that
insurance premiums must be correspondingly increased. The spreading
of the risk involves higher premiums, not only in the case of corporate
organizations, but also in the case of each individual automobile owner.
The merchant who must guard against slippery floors in his establishment
must increase the price of his wares to pay the higher premiums on his
insurance.
V. LECISLA'rlVE AcTIvnTy
It appears that in those fields of negligence where the legislatures
have prescribed formulas, there has generally been some attempt to place
a ceiling upon recovery, although liberality has been accorded the claimant
by the limiting of some of the substantive defenses formerly allowed by
the common law. This is notably true in the field of Workmen's Compen-
sation. O
The Warsaw Convcntion '" is an example of international treatment
of claims arising from travel by aircraft. It is interesting to note the reasons
given by the Secretary of State in his recommendation to the President
98. The Miami tlerald, Oct. 7, 1951, p. 4B.
99. Fla. Stat. c. 440 (1949). See Burton, Florida Workmen's Corn ensation, 5
NIIAMI L. Q. 74 (1950).
100. Ratified by U. S. Senate June 15, 1934. Proclaimed by the President June
27, 1934. "Article 22(1) Limit of Liability-Passengers. In the transportation of
passengers the liability of the carrier for each passenger shall be limited to the sum of
125,000 francs [in 1934 equal to $8,291.87] . . . Damages may be awarded in the
form of periodical payments . ., Nevertheless, by special contract, tbo carrier and the
passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability."
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of the United States, urging the adoption of the Warsaw Convention, as
follows:101
It is believed that the principle of limitation of liability will
not only be beneficial to passengers and shippers as affording a
definite basis of recovery and as tending to lessen litigation, but
that it will prove to be an aid in the development of international
air transportation, as such limitation will afford the carrier a more
definite and equitable basis on which to obtain insurance rates,
with the probable result that there would eventually be a reduction
of operating expenses for the carrier and advantages to travelers
and shippers in the way of reduced transportation charges.
A number of states, not including Florida, have set limits of recovery
under wrongful death statutes. These generally provide for actual and
reasonable expenses plus compensation not to exceed a certain sum. 0 2 A
trend is becoming apparent in Florida to increase the award to the survivor-
beneficiary, 03 the increases running somewhat in proportion to those in
personal injury actions. Another field of negligence encompassed within
legislation is the Federal Employees' Liability Act.'04
An attorney searching for negligence statutes will be referred by the
index and heading of Florida Statutes or Florida Statutes Annotated to
chapter 768. This remarkable patchwork of legislation includes wrongful
death, with a special statute of limitations, 10 5 special railroad sections,
such as those dealing with comparative negligence'00 and recovery despite
the fellow-servant rule"°" and sections concerning unguarded pits and holes.' 08
There are two limitations on damages: in the matter of pits and holes,
double the actual damage may be recovered;109 in a collision of a motor
vehicle with any animal at large on a public highway, the owner of the
animal may not recover." 0 There is but one section dealing with personal
101. HOTCHiss, TREATISE ON AVIATION LAW, 146 (1938).
102. Limit $20,000.00 - Connecticut; limit $15,000.00 - Alaska, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, Virginia, Wisconsin; limit $10,000.00
- Canal Zone, Maine, Minnesota, South Dakota, West Virginia. New Mexico has a
limitation of $10,000.00 for railroad deaths only. Rhode Island provides a minimum
limit of $2500.00, but does not allow compensatory damages for pain and suffering.
103. Pauline M. Smith v. Edward Coco, Circuit Court of Dade County, Fla.
(Oct. 1951) (Judgment of $50,010.35 for plaintiff included $25,000.00 compensatory
damages and $25,000.00 punitive damages. Trial by court without a jury. Plaintiff's
decedent, a 34-year-old Negro ear washer, was shot and killed by defendant, now under
life sentence for his murder).
104. 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 36 STAT. 291 (1910), 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C.
§§ 51-60 (1946).
105. FLA. STAT. §§ 768.01 - .04 (1949).
106. FLA. STAT. § 768.06 (1949).
107. FLA. STAT. § 768.07 (1949).
108. FLA. STAT. § 768.10 (1949).
109. FLA. STAT. § 768.11 (1949).
110. FLA. STAT. § 768.12 (1949). The negligent owner of livestock is liable in
damages for injury caused by his livestock on the public way. FLA. STAT. § 588.15
(1949).
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injury actions.. and this provides for physical examination of the injured
party. Hazardous occupations are treated in chapter 769.
VI. CONCLUSION
It thus appears that personal injury actions are governed by stare
decisis, and it is submitted that the most careful analysis of decisions will
fail to provide an adequate yardstick for damages. While a trend toward
compensation legislation is evident in allied fields, there is a struggle be-
hind the scenes between the insurance companies and representatives of
the specialized negligence lawyers, both of whom are vitally interested
in such legislative enactments as may affect them.
Many cripplied and deserving victims of accidents recover nothing
from defendants who are legally liable but financially irresponsible. Such
a defendant may lose his driver's license, if he had one. Proof of financial
responsibility prior to issuance of automobile licenses might aid such
luckless victims.
In the absence of legislation, it appears that the only guide to fair
standards of damages must come at the appellate level of the courts. It is
obvious that this is a delicate problem, as evidenced by many close de-
cisions." 2 However, there is ample precedent" 3 for preserving inviolate
the safeguards of our traditional jury system 114 as a fact-finding body under
the direction and guidance of the law as applied by the court. While
absolute uniformity is not possible, standards may be evolved which may
weigh the social and economic cousquences and may establish a more
stable basis for predictability. Unless this is done, the defendant, particu-
larly the corporate defendant, will continue to be faced with a situation
which will impede the establishment or expansion of vital industry in our
rapidly growing state.
VILLIAM R. NEBLETT
11. Fu. STAT. § 768.09 (1949).
112. E.g., Margaret Ann Supermarkets Inc. v. Scholl, supra note 73. (Four to
three decision).
113. See dissenting opinion of Holmes, C. I. in Sunray Oil Corp, v. Albritton,
supra note 83 at 752.
114. FLA. CONST., Declaration of Rights, § 3.
